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ABSTRACT
INDIVIDUAL, GROUP, AND PARADOX;
ESSENTIALS OF THE SOCIAL BOND
Alex Tonus

The relation between the individual and the group has long
been the subject of many in-depth studies. Virtually all the
scholastic disciplines recognize and acknowledge the importance of
both the organizational entity and its constituent elements.
Furthermore, many scholars have researched and reflected on the
nature of the interactions between the two concepts. This study
seeks to synchronically relate the methods and results of some of
those scholars, in an attempt to identify certain commonalities and
possible divergences.

0

This study is based on a thorough, interpretative analysis of
three works of major importance: Jean-Jacques Rousseau's The social
Contract, Sigmund Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the
Ego, and Frederick W. Taylor's Scientific Management. I chose these
works because they are the products of three disciplines which are
not intrinsically related. Although philosophy, psychoanalysis, and
management science all deal with the human condition and its
improvement, they do approach the relationships between individual
and group in their own specific ways.
The analysis of these three distinct approaches, in the works
mentioned above, reveals that each one is based on the assumption
of a paradoxical relationship between the individual and the group.
Whereas neither of the two concepts is meaningful or viable on its
own, their interaction, seen from various perspectives, seems to
produce a paradox. Whether this paradox is productive or
counterproductive remains to be determined in the human laboratory.
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INTRODUCTION

0

This study attempts to define some of the characteristics of
the social bond which permeates society since its inception. The
relationships

which

exist

between

human

beings

shape

their

societies as well as the social structures for which they develop
affinities.

The intricate nature of the relationships between

individuals and groups has been scrutinized from many different
points of view. This analysis will focus on the philosophical
considerations of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the psychological findings
of Sigmund Freud,

and the managerial viewpoints of Frederick

Winslow Taylor. It will attempt to demonstrate the paradoxical
nature of the interaction of those two complementary concepts:

0

individual, or the monad of identity for any given consciousness,
and group, or the aggregate cement that maintains a given social
bond.
This study will attempt to describe certain dynamics of change
that are inherent to these concepts, themselves. Each takes on
different characteristics when viewed under the pre-established
assumptions of different disciplines. It must also be noted that
the

individual interpretations of the theorists subsequently

influence the appearance and treatment of the subject, as well as
the understanding of those interpretations in this essay.

The

assumptions of the disciplines and the personal interests guiding
the theorists thus project biased viewpoints as much as they
reflect absolute and verifiable truths. This analysis, therefore,

0

1

cannot be equated to a mathematical model, but should be viewed

Q

rather as the result of a perspectivist approach, which follows the
rule that no single overarching reality dominates this issue, and
that the

existence

of any concept depends therefore on

ideational constellation within which it is viewed.

the

It is not

possible, nor will I attempt, in such a synchronic analysis, to
trace an historical dynamic of change that proves this paradoxical
rule: the only rule of change is that there is no rule. Instead, I
will

try to articulate my understanding of

three particular

theories which implicate the complexity inherent in both the
individual and the group, and possibly arrive at a synthesis which
takes into account certain blind spots of these interpretations.
These three interpretations result from the works of the

Q

representatives of three distinct disciplines.

It will become

apparent that each theorist refers to the social bond, i.e., the
interconnectivity between individual and group, in a technically
specific way. The given components of the social bond between
individual

and

group,

therefore,

also

reflect

particular

connotations given them by the theorists. These contrasting and
personal conceptualizations vary remarkably from the philosopher to
the psychoanalyst and the managerial theorist.
such differences emerge when we consider the respective
definitions of the group as formulated in the three approaches at
hand. For one author, the citizens of Geneva, untouched by the
workings of the Enlightenment, may represent the perfect group of
2

)

Q

virtuous individuals: therefore, every conscious effort of social
change should be directed toward establishing such a society. For
another, it may be the unorganized mob roaming the streets of
Germany which must be assigned the attributes required of a social
group to survive in a civilized society. For yet another,

the

perfect group may be a highly organized structure,

guided by

numerical

level

principles,

and

reducing

to

a

nominal

the

importance of the individual. While each writer may interpret a
concept in his own way and within the constraints of his particular
discipline, the fact remains: the concept itself has an innate and
overarching value. The complexity of such a system of multiple,
interconnected,

0

and

necessarily

biased

interpretations

thus

requires a perspectivist approach.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau dedicated the major part of his life's
work to the study of the characteristics and qualities of these two
problematic

concepts:

the

individual

and

the

group.

His

philosophical approach throughout his writing indicates a strong
and even fundamental desire to determine the conditions under which
individuality can exist and flourish. Sigmund Freud's approach to
the

same

issue,

a

century

and

a

half

later,

pursues

a

scientifically based analysis of these same concepts and the
differences between them; contrary to Rousseau, Freud examines the
individual

subject

and

draws

his

conclusions

from

clinical

observation, abstaining from the philosopher's wish to design a
3

Q

"perfect

society. 11

A third approach holds

that,

in

a world

characterized by the division of labor, the working environment
determines how and where these concepts take on values which
underlie all social interaction; in the realm of business and
productivity, efficiency is of the utmost importance. Frederick
Taylor's "scientific management" attempts to eliminate a major part
of the social interaction considered crucial by Rousseau and Freud,
to replace it with rules and regulations that reduce the individual
to an efficient component of a structured and organized group.
The questions such a juxtaposition raises are many and point
to issues crucial for the promotion of a broader approach to
overarching realities. The narrow view that many experts seem to

Q

favor is a result of their education and specialization. This
study, therefore, attempts to present certain advantages resulting
from a comparative, multi-disciplinary approach. Scrutinizing and
taking into account the research and conclusions of others may help
us to formulate more complete and,

therefore,

more efficient

answers to our problems. such an approach, however, requires a
willingness

to

question

our

paradigms

prejudices.

4

and

to

overcome

our

0

I

Individual and Group in Rousseau's
The Social Contract
If individuality has no play,
society does not advance;
if individuality breaks out
of all bounds, society perishes.
Thomas Henry Huxley
Administrative Nihilism
Paradoxically

enough,

Rousseau's

views

could

easily

be

mistaken for those of both a leftist, Marxist-Communist ideology or

Q

for

a

rightist,

totalitarian

solution

to

the

inherently

dysfunctional relationship between individual and group. Rousseau
expresses his conclusions, as well as the solution for the problem
he identifies between individual and group, in The Social Contract:
Each of us puts in common his person and his whole power
under the supreme direction of the general will; and in
return we receive every member as an indivisible part of
the whole.

(18-19)

We might easily be misled by this language which seems to say that
the individual must submit himself completely to the will of a
decision-making

elite,

in order to reap the

benefits of

an

organized or developed society. The wording seems to advocate and
promote the benefits of the group and to imply the impossibility of
5

Q

autonomous individual achievement. In other words, this statement
may be read as expressing the death of categorical individuality as
it confirms the group as the essential and fundamental social
component.
However, this socio-contractual clause also acknowledges the
antecedent existence of the individual as an entity separate from
the group. As a remedial solution to this problem, Rousseau quickly
recognizes that a change in the status of both entities must occur:
the individual, on the one hand, must acknowledge his dependence
upon the group, while on the other, the identity of the group must
change to recognize the singularity, and to permit the survival, of
the categorical individual.

0

It becomes necessary therefore to

identify or locate the source of this problem in order to prescribe
the philosopher's remedy. Any critical analysis of the origin of
Rousseau's problem is not possible,

consequently,

without an

understanding of how the philosopher procedurally defines the
concepts of "individual" and "group" themselves.
Rousseau begins his discussion of The Social Contract with the
following statement: "Man was born free and everywhere he is in
chains" (7).

This statement forms the unalterable basis for his

subsequent search for an amelioration of the human condition. He
acknowledges that the group,

larger than the individual,

has

supplanted the latter in society. "Not genius," comments Judith
Shklar, "but the primitive man repressed in each of us cries out
for help" (55).

This primitive man, this original individual,
6

Q

imprisoned by the restrictive demands imposed on him by his own
evolution, must be given the essential skills to survive in the
hostile environment he created. Contrary perhaps to the modern
reader's expectations, Rousseau then concentrates on defining group
characteristics which would permit the survival of the individual
not only despite this larger, pre-existing social organization, but
also because of that organization. The individual thus becomes the
condition sine qua non for the existence of the group

and,

therefore, for the survival of society. At the same time, this
approach also determines the futility, or even the impossibility,
of the individual without the existence of the group. Given the
fact that society, in Rousseau's eyes, is an indisputable vehicle

Q

of human evolution, the individual's value becomes meaningful only
through his contributions to the group. Paradoxically, Rousseau may
have recognized this productively value-based relationship as both
a liberating force and as one of the "chains" which ultimately
restrict individual freedom.
If we simply removed these chains, man, like an animal born
and reared in captivity,

would not survive in an environment

without familiar restrictions. Rousseau realized that the return of
the individual to what he terms "the natural state" was impossible.
In Rousseau's view only

"the natural state"

guaranteed true

individuality. Once man changed into what might be called a "social
individual," his faculties of independent decision-making were
lost, and thus his individual status was curtailed by the chains of
7

Q

society. These restrictive forces must be eliminated in a society
which is oriented toward the re-establishment of individuality,
even as Rousseau acknowledges the immutable existence of a social
construct. This void, once conceptually created, is then to be
filled by what Rousseau calls the "general will. 11

This concept is designed by the philosopher to replace the
chains, i.e.

the social and moral constraints, imposed on the

individual by a decadent society. Shklar defines the general will
as " ••• that faculty,

possessed by all men,

that defends them

against destructive impulses and influences, 11 and she further
completes her definition by describing the concept as

11 • • •

a

transposition of the most essential individual faculty to the realm

Q

of

public

experience"

(184).

The

general will

may

thus

be

understood as the basic mechanism accessible to the individual to
ensure his survival in society. Furthermore, the general will may
be

viewed

as

an

essential

component

of

the

concept

of

individuality: without general will, individuality would not exist.
Another author contends that Rousseau was the first to define man's
sense of loss of control over a social environment that has grown
too complex. (Plamenatz, 403)

The general will could thus become

the essential instrument to remodel that social environment.
Plamenatz further defines equality among members of society as an
absolute prerequisite for the development of the general will.
(395)

Thus, for the general will to be the true product of all of

the group members' individual contributions, those contributions
8

Q

must be given
compulsory,

equal weight.

Furthermore,

they must

be made

which is one of the restrictions that group life

imposes on its constituents. Equality becomes in that manner a
determinant for individuality, which illustrates the paradoxical
nature of the interaction of individual and group. According to
these interpretations, the general will may thus be understood not
only as an effect, but also as a cause, and as the essential
condition that allows the existence of both individual and group.
Consequently, the abstract nature of this concept is difficult
to define, since it refers not only to a decision-making process
based on democratic voting rules, but also to a socio-political
value system representing a crucial aspect of the change process,

Q

one which must be undergone by the members of the group. A priori,
despite this seemingly inherent difficulty, this concept of the
"general will" becomes the governing organism in Rousseau's model
of a perfect society. In other words, the "general will" stands as
a sovereign concept,

replacing the king or any traditionally

autonomous sovereign individual within such a society. This shift
underlies what I call Rousseau's Paradox: the individual must cease
to exist in order to exist.
This paradox seems productive rather than restrictive for the
philosopher's project, however: the "general will" makes a third
term of the process of change - one as yet undetermined - possible.
This dynamic third term, this new individual, whose status must be
eradicated in order to become part of a valid society, re-emerges
9

Q

subsequently as the
This

abstract

II

social individual. "
for

synthesis,

Rousseau,

emerges

as

a

brilliantly flexible one because it both describes and prescribes
social

realities

"general

will"

and social changes.
or

both

"sovereign"

Nonetheless,
indicate

a

the

terms

hierarchical

relationship within a society organized according to Rousseau's
model. The "social individual" or citizen of Rousseau's society
must not only accept the sovereign as the ultimate authority, but
also discard his own private opinions and actions in favor of the
impositions made on him by the "general will." Such totalitarian
authority may appear to be destructive, especially if viewed within
the context of traditional democratic societal regimes. However, as

Q

a purely theoretical creation, Rousseau's societal model should not
be viewed in such a context.

The negative impression we may

perceive becomes irrelevant when we look more closely at the
uncanny attributes of Rousseau's sovereign and its conceptual
other.
To take this closer look, it is necessary to distinguish
between the will of the private individual and that of the citizen
in order to determine the qualities of the modern sovereign.
Rousseau states that " ... there is a great difference between being
bound to oneself and to the whole of which one forms part" (20).
The citizen's individual will is based on and directed toward the
good of the group and, therefore, on a socio-political and moral
value system which differs strongly from one based solely on the
10

Q

rights

of

the

private

individual.

Thus,

the

general

will

articulates the ingenious combination of each individual will as
expressed by each citizen of Rousseau's society; the traditional
sovereign is being displaced by a people who shares its own
sovereignty. It must be noted, furthermore, that "the sovereign
people implies the destruction of sovereignty as a relation between
ruler and ruled" (Shklar, 168).
Each individual thus becomes his own ruler and the ruler of
all. The rule which the individual imposes on himself is accepted
in

voluntary

a

fashion

therefore,

and,

perceived

as

non

restrictive. Voluntary self-rule furthers the necessary equality
which must be established among group members as an essential

Q

prerequisite for the viability of the general will as a sovereign
force. In other words, for the people to be sovereign, to govern
itself and thus achieve its identity as a truly free social
construct, each individual must freely accept the "chains" which
guarantee that freedom. This conclusion confirms, once more, the
paradoxical nature of the dynamism between individual and group.
In

organizational

terms

I

might

refer

to

this

conceptualization of the sovereign as the result of a bottom-to
top-to-bottom procedure. The individual citizen, at the bottom, may
express his opinions in the spirit of the common good individually,
i.e., freely within the context of society. The resulting consensus
of all opinions reached by the entirety of the imaginary being, the
State, then represents the general will, which subsequently applies
11

Q

to every constituent of this body.
Although the private individual may procedurally disagree with
the general will, the individual citizen ultimately may not. It is
essential for the good of the citizen that he submit himself to the
general will. In Rousseau's words, "... whoever refuses to obey the
general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body; which
means nothing else than that he shall be forced to be free." (22)
While this statement may seem paradoxical, Rousseau's argument is
logical within the context of his model. Obeying the general will
frees the citizen from the obligations he must doubtlessly assume
as an individual who is dependent on interaction with other
individuals

0

and

groups.

Paradoxically,

a

given

individual's

disagreement with the general will would thus negate his own
prospects for individuality.
This kind of individualism, according to Rousseau's social
model, is a belief thus based on the obedience of the individual to
the general will as an expression not only of the common well
being, but also of the individual good, or of the individual's
consent to seek the common interest. Jules Steinberg argues that
Rousseau describes the general will as an individual will, and that
"a community genuinely embodying a general will will be one in
which each individual citizen seeks to promote the common good, ...
voluntarily subordinating the pursuit of private interest when so
engaged 11

(85).

Establishing an individual identity under the

governance of a general-will principle would thus depend on the
12
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willingness of the individual to accept the sovereign precepts as
his foremost priority. However, individualism would be an inchoate
and even naive concept if defined simply as freedom from personal,
individual

decision-making

through

adherence

to

directives

established by consensus. consensual decisions may be wrong and, as
such,

destructive for the group as well as for its members.

Therefore, in order to assure the well-being of the group and of
the individuals who constitute it,

the general will must be

infallible within the boundaries of its sovereignty. "It (only]
loses its natural rectitude," writes Rousseau, "when it tends to
some individual and determinate object •.." (33). Its infallibility
is thus ensured as long as the general will remains the consensual

0

and equal expression of all.
This also implies that the general will remains infallible
only in the context of the society which it governs. The common
good of the constituents of one group may not apply to another
group.

The

general

will

thus

determines

the

particular

characteristics of the group it governs and, consequently, may be
understood

as an agent of differentiation between

the group

components of a larger social construct. While the attributes of
the general will may vary according to the "social territory" in
which

it

is

sovereign,

Rousseau

defines

one

consistent

characteristic of the concept when stating that "it is contrary to
the nature of the body politic for the sovereign to impose on
itself a law which it cannot transgress" (20).

0
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Q

such a law, as expressed by the general will, applies to each
citizen

equally, as well as to the sovereign governing the

citizens. "Rousseau," comments Steinberg "attempts to instruct us
in the creation of the kind of state in which each citizen obeys
only his own will when obeying the law and thus is not deprived of
personal freedom when obeying the law"
then

becomes

a

key

feature of

(84).

Obedience to the law

Rousseau's

social

construct.

"Rousseau shared with modern individualist thinkers the conviction
that all political life is conventional, and that it can be made
obligatory only through voluntary, individual consent," comments
Patrick Riley. (241)

Obedience to the law as an expression of the

general will, therefore, becomes a statement of individualism and

Q

an

assurance

of

the

survival

of

the

individual

within

the

constraints of the group.
The complex nature of the law must be such that it encompasses
the freedom of transgression without altering the provisionally
infallible status of the sovereign. The general will is bound,
therefore, first by the common good, and by extension, by the
individual good as well. Since individual and common good are the
primary interests of both constituents and group, the general will
can only prove beneficial to both. Any expression of the sovereign
is thus infallible in the context of the group it governs. "The
general will," according to Rousseau," is always right and tends to
the public advantage." (30)

It only loses its infallibility in

interaction with other groups where it assumes the status of just

0
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another individual. Thus, in accordance with Rousseau's ideas, the

Q

individual general will of each group, although infallible within
the constraints of that group, would nevertheless have to submit
entirely in a multi-group organization, in order to permit the
establishment of a higher-order sovereign, which in turn would gain
infallibility and hence become beneficial to all constituent groups
and the individuals who compose them.
As an infallible concept,

the general will represents an

instrument which assures the survival of the individual in society.
The paradoxical nature of this process, however, emerges in the
philosopher's procedural requirement that the individual abandon
all his rights to the will of the community in order to be endowed
by

Q

that

community

with

these

same

individual

rights.

The

individual, therefore, undergoes a transformation in which the
dynamic element manifests the general will. Although the product of
this transformation has many basic characteristics in common with
the original, it differs in one essential aspect: it now becomes
constituted as a part of a group. Rousseau's acceptance of the
inevitability of social evolution resulted in the design of this
different

kind

of

individualism,

existence of society,

constrained

by

the

but endowed nonetheless with individual

freedoms that can only exist in society.

15
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perhaps
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II
Individual and Group in Freud's
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.

Man is by nature a social animal
living in a community.
st. Thomas Aquinas
on Princely Government

Sigmund Freud's research into the different natures of the
individual and the group, in this text dating from 1921, focuses on
the changes that occur within the psychological make-up of the

Q

individual

as he or she becomes

a member

of

a

group.

The

psychologist's analysis not only reveals the probable causes and
effects of that process for the individual, but also enables him to
describe certain general characteristics of the group.
Although

Freud

draws

profound

distinctions

between

the

individual and the group, he nevertheless acknowledges the fact
that both exert an inevitable attraction on each other. A natural
consequence of this acceptance would be then to concentrate the
analysis on those characteristics of the individual which fall
outside of his generally researched and accepted profile. In other
words, since individual psychology concentrates on the study of the
behavior exhibited by the individual to satisfy his personal
instincts, group psychology should be concerned with the specific

0
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Q

behavioral conduct displayed by the group member in order to
satisfy the demands of the group.
The individual within a group is subjected to the influence of
other group members,

i.e., he experiences a different kind of

psychological intensity not directed toward the satisfaction of his
own personal instincts. The group's set of values is not that of
the

individual;

moreover,

since a

group

is not a "natural"

phenomenon, but rather an organization formed by human beings, its
goals are to a certain degree artificial. The group members'
behavior

is

consequently not comparable

to

that

of

a

free

individual.
For Freud, the individual member of a group must therefore

Q

develop a "special instinct" to behave in accordance with the
requirements of the group. By comparing individual with group
behavior, Freud discerns within the psychological profile of the
group member a social instinct, referred to as "herd instinct,

11

which constitutes in the words of the psychologist the "group
mind." (170)

This "herd instinct" is not a natural or "primitive"

part of the individual's psychological make-up, although it might
be traceable to the small original groups such as the family.
Freud's analysis thus concentrates on exposing the features of this
special instinct by examining its causes and effects in human
cultures.
Rather
various

than

societal

considering
entities,

the specific
Freud
17

attempts

characteristics
to

describe

of
the

Q

attributes

of those

groups in the terms of

the established

nomenclature of individual psychology; he also researches the
reasons for the apparent influence exercised by the group over the
individual, and the effects on the individual by the group. As a
starting point, Freud uses two prominent descriptions of the group:
the first given by Gustave Le Bon in The Crowd: A study of the
Popular Mind (1920), and the second by William McDougall in The
Group Mind (1920). Although McDougall's approach reflects a certain
optimism with respect to the qualitative values of the group, Freud
seems more inclined toward Le Bon's negative portrayal.
Among other negative characteristics, Gustave Le Bon describes
the group mind as being credulous and open to influence, having

Q

very limited critical abilities,

and avid of authority.

Freud

justifies these characteristics by looking at the psychological
changes that occur within the individual as he evolves in his role
of social animal.
As a living collective organism, the group always expresses
its feelings in a basic manner, affirms Le Bon. The group tends to
exaggerate its feelings and is unable to differentiate between
extremes. Therefore, doubt becomes certainty, since the group will
not accept uncertainty, and antipathy becomes hatred, since it
cannot express "shades of gray."

However, if one accepts Le Bon's

characterization, love also will be carried to an extreme by the
group. Freud's analysis shows indeed that love, in its most general
sense, as well as hate and weakness, plays a crucial role in the
18

Q

relationship between individual and group.
Group morals, according to Le Bon, are based on the "cruel,
brutal, and destructive instincts" which the group members strive
to satisfy, but which they suppress as individuals.

( 17 3)

The

group would thus effectively negate the natural inhibitions of its
members to satisfy its own instincts. Although Le Bon seems to
indicate that those instincts are generally base, he admits that
under certain conditions the group is capable of high achievements,
such as unselfishness and devotion to its ideals.

Heinz Kohut

contends that the ambitions and ideals of a group ensure its
continuity and,

more importantly perhaps,

actions. (n. 1, 42)

Q

its most

important

such conditions, however, exist only when a

group is being influenced in a positive way.
A group can be influenced through exaggeration and repetition,
claims Le Bon. (Freud 172)

The historical truth of this can be

observed, for instance, in the workings of Nazi propaganda, as well
as in the impact of advertising on today's world. Joseph Goebbels,
the

propaganda minister of the Third Reich, is reported to have

stated that a lie, if repeated often enough, will turn into the
truth. Exaggeration permits the reduction of a complex decision
making process to a single-solution procedure devoid of ambiguity.
Since the rejection of ambiguity is an accepted principle of group
behavior,

it is evident that a group will eagerly and without

discrimination accept a lie as truth, as long as it meets the
criteria

of

exaggeration

and

repetition.
19

Modern

advertising

0

practices often operate on the borders of ethical conduct, but more
often succeed in convincing their target groups of the benefits of
their products. This demonstrates that exaggeration and repetition
are a powerful means to overcome a basic characteristic of the
group, i.e., its conservative nature.
conservatism is an essential feature of collective social
entities. Once a group is formed it must establish traditions in
order to survive. consequently, the group will oppose attempts at
innovation.

From a socio-political point of view,

innovation

threatens the existence of the group because it is akin to
revolution. Psychologically, however, innovation tends to interfere
with the emotional ties established between the group members and
their leader, as well as with those established among themselves.

Q

Freud's findings indicate that the group mind is largely based on
this dual emotional relationship. Rejection of innovation naturally
leads to intolerance.

Groups are known for their aversion to

behavior and ideas deviating from their own. consequently, gender
prejudice, religious persecution, and racism are but some of the
effects of group conservatism and intolerance.
The

narrowmindedness

which

characterizes

group

behavior

results in a strong desire for authority, and therefore fosters
obedience. It may appear masochistic to the individual to submit
himself voluntarily to the limitations established by the group
mind. However, since the group as such is incapable of critical
reasoning and capable only of extreme feelings, it is logical for
20

Q

it to submit itself to strong authority based on force.

This

situation becomes even more accepted as the group members recognize
the superior strength of the collective.
Although the collective strength of the group is far superior
to that of the single individual, its intelligence is far lower,
according to Le Bon. Freud's analysis does not address this point
specifically.

However,

because Freud

confirms

the

moral

and

emotional discrepancies of the group mind, it stands to reason that
the intellectual capacities of groups parallel their emotional and
moral behavior. Since these seem to be comparable to those of
primitive man, collective intelligence would appear to be similar
to that of a pre-societal individual.
Because the critical faculties of the group mind seem to be

Q

non-existent, objective reality is of no importance to groups.
Groups demand illusions and choose the unreal over the real, as
they choose the untruth over the truth. Freud acknowledges the
importance of myth to society in his speculative approach to the
mechanism of leadership within the group. Leaders may be persons or
ideas.

The group members associate leadership with prestige.

According to Freud, prestige therefore results in the paralysis of
critical faculties as it exerts a hypnotic fascination upon the
constituents of the group. (173)
Le Bon's characterization of the group, supported by Freud's
findings,

emphasizes the negative or violent aspects of the

collective, although this also leads to the paradoxical conclusion
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that a group is capable of the worst as well as of the best. One
may

infer

also

from

this

portrayal

that

the

group

has

a

predominantly negative effect on the individual. It appears that
the group member allows those primal emotional and moral traits,
which he inhibited during a transitional phase of evolution between
primitive and pre-societal individual,

to surface in order to

satisfy the crude instincts of the group.
Kohut condenses the Freudian group theory as follows:
Group pressure diminishes individuality; it leads to a
primitivization of the mental processes, in particular to
a partial paralysis of the ego and to a lowering of
resistances. The diminution of the influence of the ego
is then followed by the cathartic expression of archaic

0

(or at any rate undisguised) impulses, emotions, and
ideation, i.e., by the revelation of material which is
not accessible in normal circumstances. (421)
Since it seems to be impossible for an individual to exist outside
the group, partly because of the "herd instinct" which draws him
towards the group and partly because of the hostility displayed by
the

group

toward

outside

elements,

the

individual's

only

alternative would consist of "making the best" of the situation.
Freud,

unlike

Rousseau,

does

not

appear

to

believe

in

the

possibility of fundamental individuality (even of a different kind)
within the group. Because of the interconnection between ego and
group mind, only a group leader may be capable of experiencing a
22
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certain degree of individual freedom.
These characteristics of the group (mind) apply primarily to
the case of an unorganized group.

McDougall states that the

paradoxical behavior of the group, i.e., being capable of the worst
but

also

the

best,

stems

from

level

its

of

organization.

Unorganized groups, such as the ones described by Le Bon seem to
behave immaturely and "in the worst cases•••like•••a wild beast,
rather than ••• human beings" (175).
However, whether the group is organized or not has little
effect on the attraction it is able to exert on the individual.
Freud concurs with McDougall's finding that the individual is drawn
to the group in an almost hypnotic way,

Q

which he defines as

"emotional contagion." The group provides the individual with an
experience he cannot undergo elsewhere: intensified emotion. This
pleasurable experience is intense enough, according to McDougall,
to trigger the unconditional surrender of the individual to the
group. Although this "social hallucinogenic" may indeed contribute
largely to the fascinating appeal of the group, it is insufficient
to explain the change that occurs within the psychological profile
of

the

individual.

Freud's

analysis

demonstrates

this

transformation as resulting from a kind of transvasing, occurring
between the individual's ego and ego ideal, as he is transformed
into a group constituent. McDougall's

II

emotional contagion" may

thus be regarded as a triggering device for the alteration of the
individual and a cornerstone in the formation of a group.
23
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It appears then that the individual who has no choice but to
join a group must undergo a process of change, which is always
detrimental to both his identity and his behavior as an individual.
Furthermore, the individual's survivability, as a lesser being, now
depends on the larger survivability of the group. Freud's paradox
can thus be stated as follows: the survivability of a group as the
sole guarantee for the survival of its constituents, is contingent
on the evolutionary regression of those same constituents.
Once a group is formed, its survivability depends on its level
of

organization.

In the first place,

group members must

be

consciously aware of the group's nature, functions, and capacities
in order to develop strong emotional ties with the group mind.
Group continuity results from the development of traditions,

Q

customs, and habits which reflect the values of its constituents.
A group structure must exist which provides and assigns specialized
individual functions to the members. Finally; groups must interact
and compete with other similar but different organizations. Groups
organized along these guidelines exhibit traits which are far
superior

to

those

of

unorganized

collectives,

according

to

McDougall.
Improved group performance would thus seem to result from
organization.

While

McDougall

affirms

that

psychological

disadvantages and low collective intellectual performance are
remedied

through

organization,

Freud

indicates

that

group

improvement is a function of the transferring of individual values
24
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"is to equip the group with the attributes of the individual."
Therefore, the group must undergo a transformation in order

(176)

to improve itself and, consequently, the psychological make-up of
its constituents.
Improving the group depends thus on increasing its level of
civilization, morality, and ethical behavior. In essence, the group
must be humanized. Theoretically speaking, such humanization would
allow the group to become psychologically mature,

emotionally

differentiated, and morally critical. Psychological maturity would
result

in

the suppression

differentiation

would

of

permit

primitive
a

full

instincts;

range

of

emotional

feelings

and

reactions; moral criticism would allow the group to discern between
good and bad, and to structure itself and its behavior accordingly.

Q

However, the question remains: how might a group be humanized?
In accordance with Freud's statement that the group's level of
humanization is contingent on the "transfer" of individual values
to the group mind, raising the basic membership requirements may be
one such means of improvement. The coherence of a group depends on
the

common

formulated

ideals
at

a

of its constituents.
high

level,

in

If

comparison

those
with

ideals

are

individual

standards, and further accepted by the members, then the overall
performance of the group should be equivalent to that of the
individual constituents. However, setting high standards for a
group would have to occur quasi naturally during the formation of
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that group itself.
It seems logical that individuals whose ideals, perceptions,
and interests coincide to a certain degree would be naturally
inclined to form a group. If group values and membership criteria
are established and recognized during the period of formation,
those individuals accepting them would join deliberately, while
those who disagree would abstain before the group is formed. Once
the group is established it will then act in accordance with its
basic criteria, which were previously agreed upon by the individual
constituents.
Raising the values of a group after its formation appears to
me to be very difficult, if not impossible. Individuals join a

Q

group for the compatibility they perceive between their ideals and
those of the group. When a member loses faith in the group's goals,
he will leave that group either voluntarily of involuntarily.
Incompatibility with the group's ideals necessarily engenders non
group

requirements.

Hence,

the

dissenting

compliance

with

individual,

if he does not leave the group voluntarily,

will

eventually be ostracized by the other constituents. Raising (or
lowering, for that matter) the basic values of the collective would
entail incompatibility between the group and its constituents,
unless such action is based on consensus. Reaching consensus,
especially on raising expectations, seems to be an improbable
option

in

groups.

Setting group values

should

therefore

be

considered during the formation of the group in order to ensure its
26
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coherence and survivability.
To Freud, such features depend on the love of the individual
for the group and the emotional ties established in that way.
These, according to the psychologist, constitute·the essence of the
group mind. (178)

Love relationships do not ?nly exist between the

individual and the group, as such, but also between that individual
and the other constituents.

Love,

in this context,

understood in its broadest meaning,

i.e.,

is to be

including love for

humanity, as well as for "concrete objects" and "abstract ideas."
(177)
Since the group projects emotional ties onto its constituents,
these become more intense if the members can identify a leader (or
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even a leading idea) within the group. Freud chooses to analyze
groups from the point of view of their leadership, existent or non
existent,

rather

than

in

accordance

with

their

degree

of

organization. According to the psychoanalyst, all kinds of groups,
natural and artificial, require an "external force to keep them
together." (178)

In shaping his research along those lines, Freud

arrives at a picture of the group quite consistent with Le Bon's.
Thus, by examining the relationships of the individuals to and
within the group and the leadership characteristics of the latter,
Freud appears to come to the conclusion that the individual is
diminished as he changes into a group member.
The problem now is to determine the nature of this diminution
or degradation,

and the ways in which it occurs. Using two
27
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artificial groups as his models (the catholic Church and the Army) ,
Freud concludes that the individual may experience what he terms
"libidinal cathexis" when his ties to the group leader or idea are
severed, or when the group, as a collective, is exposed to unusual
danger.

(180)

constituents

The

double

ties

and their leader,

which

exist

between

group

as well as among themselves,

constitute the backbone of the group. The rejection of a group
member by his leader, i.e. the "father surrogate, 11 results in his
rejection by the group as well. The common ties which exist between
the constituents are based on their collective adoration for the
group leader. Should the latter reject one individual, the others
would most certainly follow the lead. Harsh treatment, such as the

Q

abuse

of

power,

therefore

contributes

to

the

possible

disintegration of the group. In order to avoid libidinal cathexis,
the individual must accept certain limitations, i.e., change his
personality to fit the group mind. These limitations, according to
Freud, include the acceptance of other group members as equals
sharing the leader's love. Consequently, the personality change
which the individual must undergo engenders a lowering of his
individuality, freedom of choice, and decision-making faculties. It
appears, however, that many are willing to trade their sense of
individuality for the security and emotional support of a group.
While a group is capable of providing safety and protection to
its members, it may be exposed to danger from the outside. As
danger to the collective increases libidinal ties are strained and
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panic may ensue. Group panic would thus represent another proof for
the

existence of the double emotional ties within

a group.

Furthermore, this extreme social emotion, born from the collective
effort (resulting from these libidinal affective ties) to defend
the group, paradoxically provokes its destruction. Thus, flawed
relationships among group members

(especially constituent vs.

leader) and abnormal relationships among groups are the two major
causes for the disintegration of the group as a general concept.
Freud's analysis of particular kinds of groups, such as the
Church and the Army, reveals their specific characteristics and,
consequently, the differences between them. Functionally different
groups require their members to behave in different ways. While
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both Church and Army have a similar organizational structure, their
members are expected to form different ties with the leadership of
those groups. Both require members to establish emotional ties with
the "father figures" (priests or sergeants, pope or commander-in
chief); however,

the Church condones and encourages a certain

identification of the members with the Church leader, in this case
Jesus Christ. Although most church members are aware of the fact
that they cannot realize a complete identification with the ideal
personification of God, their aspirations may satisfy the demands
of their "ego ideal." on the other hand, a soldier identifying with
his superior would not only transgress basic military rules, but
appear ridiculous in the eyes of his equals. The satisfaction of
the soldier's ego ideal may depend on rote mimesis, or obedient
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imitation, rather than identification.
For Freud, the ego and ego ideal are those elements of the
individual's psychological constitution which are most influenced
by his transformation into a group member. His definitions indicate
that the ego ideal is the individual's ideal perception of himself.
In many cases, an individual may not be able to realize that
perfect person. Group membership then becomes a means of satisfying
some, if not most of the demands that the individual's ego ideal
imposes upon him. Through the process of identification with the
group ideal, the individual may realize some of his own ideals.
There would thus be a transference of individual values to group
values. This transference raises the problem of conscious and/or
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unconscious misinterpretation by the individual of group ideals,
but more importantly, it indicates that a group member's ego is
disadvantaged

as

compared

his

to

ego

ideal.

libidinal

The

relationship between group member and group ideal/leadership thus
facilitates the identification process, which then results in the
preferential treatment of the ego ideal and the neglect of the ego.
Freud thus arrives at the conclusion that a group is "a number of
individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their
ego ideal, 11 and that the group constituents have "consequently
identified themselves with one another in their ego.•• " (193).
The

relationships
influence

from

neglect of the individual ego resulting
is

thus

the group

another

indication

of

exerts on its members.
30
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group

detrimental

Freud,

by

these

Q

findings, explains Le Bon's observations concerning the negative
influence of group membership. While the ego may suffer, however,
the ego ideal appears to flourish.
advantage

may

exceed

If one considers that the

the disadvantage,

one

conclusion

would

necessarily suggest that the group influence is beneficial rather
than detrimental. However, considering that individual ideals are
replaced,

to a large extent,

by those of the group,

Freud's

reader's conclusion must remain that a person's individuality
deteriorates as he or she joins a group.
Freud's findings indicate that this deterioration, however, is
not an inevitable nor total result. Under certain conditions, an
individual

Q

may

from

profit

joining

a

group.

However,

the

individual's psychological profile must be flawed for this to
occur. Freud indicates that neurotic individuals would be rejected
by groups; however, he also finds that "where a powerful impetus
has been given to group formation neuroses may diminish ••.. " (208)
This paradox can be explained if one examines Freud's definition of
"neurosis."

Essentially,

neurotic

behavior

results

from

an

individual's efforts to attain his ego ideal by accepting a lie for
reality. Such an individual tends to accept his wishes as reality
rather than to act upon achieving his goals. The group is much more
likely to reach its goals as a result of the collective effort. If
the

collective

goals

coincide

with

those

of

the

neurotic

individual, and if the group accepts that individual as a member,
then the influence of the group may have therapeutic value. This
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may explain the relative success of associations such as Alcoholics
Anonymous. Freud's analysis may therefore allow us to conclude that
while groups tend to exert a negative influence on the individual,
they may be beneficial to those whose psychological make-up differs
from the average.
Another negative aspect of the group is revealed when Freud
explains the kind of steps taken by individuals who strive for
leadership within a group. According to the psychoanalyst, the
original leader (father surrogate) must be denigrated, turned into
a "totemistic monster" slain by the "hero" who wants to assume
leadership. (203)

The new leader must then convince the group of

his superior leadership qualities, for the group to remain in
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existence. This is achieved through what Freud terms "the heroic
myth, 11 a disguising of "the truth with lies in accordance with [the
The psychoanalyst then concludes

new leader's) longing" (203).

that myth is the process by which individuality can be achieved
within a group.

(204)

Group leaders,

being the

objects

of

idealization, would thus be able to enjoy individual freedom as a
result

of

their

conscious

manipulations

of

their

credulous

followers. Since leadership changes are common in groups, however,
it must also be assumed that they do accept myth for reality; this
brings

us

back to Le

Ben's

characterization

concerning

the

eagerness of groups for the unreal and their rejection of reality.
However, Freud's explanation of this negative group behavior seems
to be based on conjecture rather than clinical observation.
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Through clinical observation the psychoanalyst has found
explanations for the behavioral changes undergone by the individual
who becomes a group member, as well as for the generally negative
influences of the collective on the individual. By doing so, Freud
confirms Le Bon's perceptions to a large extent. He associates the
limited

critical

abilities,

the

openness

to

influence,

the

credulity, and the avidity for authority, all described by Le Bon,
to the fascination of the group members with its leadership and the
association of leadership and prestige made by the constituents.
The low moral standards of groups, along with their tendency toward
exaggerated or extreme expressions of crude collective feelings,
stem from the fact that they are situated on a lower evolutionary
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level than the individual. The individual group member will act
according to these primitive standards and, therefore, be degraded
in his individuality. Such degradation can be found in the fact
that the group constituent tends to disregard the needs of his ego
to satisfy those of his ego ideal, which he projects upon and even
identifies with the values of the group. While Freud explains the
negative

of

attributes

psychological terms,
speculative

when

he

based

groups

on

observation

and

in

he appears to be less specific and more
deals

with

the

positive

ones.

The

psychoanalyst's comments on the possible improvement of group
behavior are limited to his recommendation to transfer individual
values to the group. Freud's evaluation of McDougall's model (see
pages 24-25) leads him to define group improvement as "the problem
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[that] consists in how to procure for the group precisely those
features which were characteristic of the individual ••• " (176).
A

general

conclusion

that

may

be

drawn

from

this

interpretation of Freud's essay is that the individual will suffer
psychologically from joining any group. The group's influence is
such that it dictates its behavioral requirements to its members,
who consciously and unconsciously must act in accordance with those
requirements.

In

other

the

words,

must

individual

accept

limitations to his values and, consequently, to his status. As a
group member, that individual is thus changed into a lesser version
of himself, morally, emotionally, and intellectually.
The individual's survival within the group is nonetheless

Q

related to the values of the collective. If the group behaves in a
fashion comparable to that of the individual, the latter's identity
will

be affected,

although possibly

to a negligible extent.

Changing, i.e., improving group behavior thus becomes the key for
the survival of individuality.

However,

the transposition of

individual values into group values does not appear to be an
appropriate mechanism of change.
If individual values are to replace those of the group, then
the group must have a mechanism allowing it to recognize and accept
external influence. Internal influence can only be exerted by group
members who must accept existing group values for the group to
survive.

Group

members

would

thus

seem

structurally changing collective behavior.
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be

incapable

of

on the other hand,

Q

modeling group behavior on a set of ideal concepts is probably a
futile effort, since neither the group nor its members need to
change their ways, as long as the group is successfully surviving.
A need for betterment may arise, however, when the group's behavior
becomes a cause for poor performance in its competition with
others. At this moment, the group will be able to compare its
collective behavior to that of its competitors, whether they are
other groups or individuals.
The

motivation

for

change

would

thus

result

from

the

comparative performance of a group in a larger system. The impetus
for change derives logically from the group's leadership who are
aware of other groups. However, if that leadership is the result of
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a democratic election, i.e.,

composed of members of the group

itself, the change required to ensure the survival of the group is
likely not to take place. Paradoxically, in-order for the leaders
to be able to induce change, their values must be different from
those of the group constituents, and by extension, for those of the
group as a whole. Leaders who emerge from the constituency most
likely possess the qualities of that constituency. Thus, in order
to change group behavior, the leadership ought to be changed, and
replaced by external agents. The loyalty required to support such
an individual as a leader,

however,

may be hard to gain or

maintain.
Since external factors seem to be the primary cause which
could motivate a group to change its behavior, they necessarily
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play a role in the selection and maintenance of any group's
leadership. Clearly, it is not necessary for the external agent to
assume actual leadership. External influences, ideas and actions,
may

be

influential

transformation.

enough

to

bring

about

a

collective

such influences necessarily enrich the group's

psychology, since they represent points of views and behavior which
differ from its own. In general, as the group is submitted to more
external influence, its behavior becomes more differentiated and,
consequently,

evolves to a higher level.

Improvement of group

behavior would thus be a result of a dynamic process of evolution
of the group among its competition.
For Freud, then, the group represents a framework within which
the individual must exist in a state of limited individuality.

Q

Unlike Rousseau, who claims that man may survive in society by
expressing his individual will in terms of the general will of that
society, Freud seems to conclude that man must submit himself to
the will of the group expressed by its lowest denominator.
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III
Individual and Group in F.

w.

Taylor's

The Principles of Scientific Management
Some men owe most of their
greatness to the ability of
detecting in those they destine
for their tools the exact quality
of strength that matters for their
work.
Joseph Conrad
Lord Jim
Among all modern groups, and especially in the industrialized
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countries, the working environment may be the most influential
setting with regard to the individual. Not only does it have a
direct impact on the working person, but it also affects any and
all of those who are related to the worker in one way or another.
Thus, in industrialized societies,

the work place shapes both

individual and family behavior to a great extent.
In an essentially capitalist world, the goal of any work group
is

to

acquire

power

through money.

The

competition

between

companies in a similar market place ensures the constant growth of
productivity of that industrial sector. In order to survive as a
group within such a competitive environment, business entities must
adopt behaviors geared toward success, i.e., they will strive to be
the most productive among their peer groups. Productivity (and the
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methods to increase it)
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is the essence of Frederick Winslow

Taylor's "Scientific Management."
Taylor describes productivity as the "initiative" potential of
the workers. He defines "initiative" as "hard work, good-will,
and ••• ingenuity." (36)

His determination to design a system that

might increase productivity stems from his scrutiny of the state of
contemporary

industry.

Taylor

found

that

the

professional,

traditionally transmitted knowledge of the workers was a mystery to
most managers, and thus a major asset for the "doers. 11 Management's
only

solution

to

the

problem

of

informed

workers

who

" .•• deliberately work as slowly as they dare •.. " was a system of
incentives. (33-34)

However, despite promotions, better working

environments, and shorter working hours, management, according to
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Taylor was unable to optimize worker productivity.
management"

was

to

be

the

perfect

tool

to

"Scientific

unfreeze

this

unproductive status quo, and to induce the dynamic change required
to take productivity to new heights.
To achieve this goal, the organizational structure of the work
place must be remodeled. "Scientific management" requires the
transfer of professional knowledge to management, as well as the
transformation of individual work into standardized tasks. Taylor
describes the new functions of management as follows:
The managers assume (under scientific management] the
burden of gathering together all of the traditional
knowledge which in the past has been possessed by the
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workmen and then of classifying, tabulating, and reducing
this knowledge to rules, laws, and formulae which are
immensely helpful to the workmen in doing their daily
work.

(36)

He further defines the new managerial tasks as the selection,
training, and development of the worker, and as an obligation to
"heartily cooperate with the men ••. " (36). This new corporate
behavior, according to Taylor, then leads to an equal division of
work.
Taylor thus makes a rhetorical attempt to demonstrate that
management takes on an additional burden to relieve the workers of
the overwhelming task of taking responsibility for their work.

Q

"..• even if the worker was well suited to the development and use
of

scientific

data,"

writes

Taylor

in

what

I

consider

a

condescending tone, "it would be physically impossible for him to
work at his machine and at a desk at the same time"
contrary,

perhaps,

to the popular interpretation,

(36).

"scientific

management" does not necessarily consist in a redistribution of
knowledge, authority, and responsibility in favor of management.
Rather, it promotes a coming together of "thinkers" and "doers"
sharing equally in a common effort to optimize productivity.
The implementation of "scientific management" in the work
place requires not only the transformation of the basic structures
of the business environment, but also some change in the ways
individual workers perform their tasks. More importantly, it also
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decrees a change in management philosophy. While Taylor's methods,
applied to the industrial environment, are conducive to increased
productivity, they might also tend to influence the individual
workers in a negative manner. Although the controversy surrounding
the "father of scientific management" is not the object of this
paper, it becomes understandable as we examine Taylor's paradoxical
approach to change in the work place in light of our preceding
discussion of Rousseau and Freud.
Taylor's "scientific management" is aimed at achieving the
highest possible productivity in an industrial setting. In order to
reach this goal, work functions are reduced to their simplest form,
and methods are designed to perform those functions in an optimal
way. Once these methods have been tested and approved, they become
integral parts of the overall organizational system. "Scientific
management" thus requires changing the system itself, rather than
addressing specific problems and needs within the organization.
Taylor's approach to management is thus system-based and
consequently disregards the individuals who compose the system. The
interactions of individuals and group are subjected to a relatively
rigid set of rules and regulations governing work functions. It
appears

then,

that "scientific

management"

is

an

impersonal

approach that requires human beings to execute systemic orders for
the sake of productivity. However, Taylor's "scientific management"
is not just a conglomerate of time and motion studies, ergonomics,
and

efficiency

devices.

Taylor
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rejects

any

definitions

of
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"scientific management" along those lines as misinterpretations.
The following definition was given by F. W. Taylor during an
investigation conducted by a Congressional Committee:
Now, in its essence, scientific management involves a
complete mental revolution on the part of the workingman
engaged in any particular establishment or industry-- a
complete mental revolution on the part of these men as to
their duties toward their work, toward their fellow men,
and toward their employers. And it involves the equally
complete mental revolution on the part of those on the
management's side- the foreman, the superintendent, the
owner of the business, the board of directors-- a complete
mental revolution on their part as to their duties toward
their fellow workers in the management, toward their
workmen, and toward all of their daily problems. And
without this complete mental revolution on both sides
scientific management does not exist.

(27, emphasis

added)
Thus,

workers

and

managers

alike

must

undergo

significant

behavioral change in order for "scientific management" to be
effective. This approach demonstrates once more that Taylor's
primary efforts are directed toward system efficiency, and that the
work place constituents,

(i.e. , individuals) must adapt to the

system requirements. The system thus takes precedence over the
human factor.

0

41

0

Taylor's

requirements

put

forth

in

his

definition

of

"scientific management" are likely to inflict stress on the pre
existing relationships between the individuals and the group, as
well as on the relationships between group constituents. The
"complete mental revolution" which group members have to undergo
may be interpreted as having to adopt a new vision of work itself,
i.e., of all the values connected with a person's professional
behavior. In essence, human behavior under "scientific management"
is reduced to a mechanical effort to satisfy organizational needs
stemming from the competitive environment in which the group must
survive.
The only apparent incentive for this mechanical effort seems
to be monetary. As production increases, profits increase. Higher
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profits result in higher wages and greater satisfaction of business
owners. Whether financial incentives are sufficient to compensate
for the loss of individuality,

pride in workmanship,

and the

disappearance of social interaction within the group, however, is
doubtful.
The reduction of work into the simplest functions that can be
performed interchangeably by many trained and untrained persons
results, in my opinion, in a "systemic" loss of individuality.
Taylor's approach, unlike Freud's, seems to lack psychological
insight into human nature and,

unlike Rousseau's,

appears to

disregard philosophical considerations concerning the undeniable
social bond which constitutes the fabric of any group. "Scientific
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management" divides the working population into thinkers and doers,
attaching prestige to the former and stigma to the latter.

It

creates a gap between a small elite of experts and a majority of
unquestioning performers. While Taylor contends that an efficient
system must be based on work functions reduced to the lowest common
denominator and thus requiring minimal skills, he does not seem to
realize that this approach is an insult to the intelligence of
anyone required to work under those conditions.

Clearly,

one

logical consequence of "scientific management" is that those who
are forced (in order to meet their most basic physiological needs)
to perform tasks which require only the adherence to an impersonal
set of prescribed movements will eventually regard their work, and

Q

hence themselves, as nothing more than an anonymous element of an
artifice, a "cog in the machine." Taylor's "mental revolution"
applied to the individual,

may thus be nothing more than

a

requirement to surrender individuality utterly and completely.
According

to

this

reasoning,

the group,

as

a

composite

of

individuals, is likely to become anonymous as well. The survival of
the group would be contingent on the functional efficiency of its
governing system.

If such a system became universal,

the end

product of the free market system would simply be productivity.
Competition on that level would negate innovation and quality
which, in my opinion, are essential driving forces of the market.
Taylor's "mental revolution" appears then to be detrimental to
individuals at all levels of the organizational hierarchy, and to

0
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have a negative effect on group identity. It is this identity which
holds the group together, and thus makes it effective. However, in
a world of anonymous competing systems, functional group members
are interchangeable. Besides making such terms as "belonging" and
"duty" obsolete, such a world is likely to experience no emotions
or ethical concerns with regard to its constituents. In essence,
its existence is warranted solely as a mechanical money-making
machine.
Taylor himself may have experienced some doubts regarding the
impersonal, mechanizing tendencies of his managerial theory. In
Shop Management he concedes that "no system of management •.. should
be applied in a wooden way" ( 184) .

Q

By advocating relations between

workers and management based on esteem and trust,

Taylor may have

wanted to humanize "scientific management," although an ulterior
motive could be to find ways to avoid friction between the two
groups, and therefore, to increase productivity.
Whether recognizing the human factor as an essential component
of "scientific management" would actually soften its impact on
individual and group, is debatable. While civilized behavior however determined by workers and management - will contribute to
the enhancement of the working environment, it may also violate the
basic principles of "scientific management." This managerial theory
appears to have the single objective of increasing productivity and
hence profits. Although producing higher wages may be interpreted
as a "humanizing" feature of "scientific management,"
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it is

Q

essentially a result of an emotionally and socially sterile system
in which human behavior, whether constructive or destructive, has
no place.
In The Principles of Scientific Management, Taylor describes
some aspects of human behavior which are admissible. "Scientific
management" requires the following:

science, not rule of thumb.
Harmony, not discord.
Cooperation, not individualism.
Maximum output, in place of restricted output.
The development of each man to his greatest efficiency
and prosperity. (140)

Q

Although

these

principles

appear

to

stress

the

need

for

constructive interaction between group members and group values,
they may also be interpreted as basic system requirements. It is
significant

in

this

context

to

note

the

juxtaposition

of

"cooperation" and "individualism" as opposites. cooperation results
from the consensual efforts of individuals in attaining a mutual
goal.

Since "scientific management" defines the organizational

goals, the "cooperation" mentioned in these principles appears to
refer to the individual's submission to system requirements rather
than

a

voluntary

constituents.

and

constructive

relationship

among

group

"Scientific management" denies knowledge to the

workers, yet expects them to strive for the achievement of the
goals set by the system without questioning them. It expects a
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group reaction triggered solely by the system and devoid of
individual input. Positive cooperation cannot exist under those
conditions; opposition is much more likely. A constructive relationship among group members is then
negated by the specific reference to "each man" in the last of the
principles cited above. The message here seems to indicate that
each worker is to be considered a single element in a mechanistic
system. Each element must be designed to perform in accordance with
the highest possible standards of efficiency in order to conform to
the predetermined system performance. Adherence to comparative
efficiency standards eliminates any deviations from the preset
norms, and thus any individuality.

0

Standards and norms emerge as the fundamental essence of
"scientific management." The remodeling of work into tasks requires
the setting of performance levels and restrictions. The exact way
of performing a task is described in all its detail, including the
exact time allowed to execute its specific requirements. It seems
obvious to this author that individuality cannot be a part of a
theory which is limited to such numbers.

While a scientific

approach to productivity may be required to satisfy the demands of
a capitalist work environment, it must make abstraction of the
human factor. The science of numbers is in the minds of many the
only exact one; individuality, in all its unpredictability, cannot
be translated into numbers. F.W. Taylor, for that reason, cannot
require a working group to adhere to the numbers on the one side,
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and to human behavioral standards on the other.

"Scientific

management" as described by Taylor thus mixes concepts which are
incompatible.
Based on these findings, the application of

"scientific

management" would result in the elimination of the individual, and
hence the group. The monetary incentives of the system may be
sufficient to satisfy the physiological requirements of the worker,
i.e.,

the

need

for

and

shelter,

food,

clothing;

however,

individuals must be able (or at least have the choice) to address
their needs for safety, love, and esteem, in order to reach, what
Maslow calls, their potential of self-actualization. Without that
possibility,

0

the

individual

cannot

develop

his

potential.

Consequently, he cannot form, along with others, a group of human
constituents.
"Scientific management," contrary to the approaches to group
dynamics brought forth by Rousseau and Freud, appears to aim at the
destruction of individuality. It seems to negate the importance of
the social bond for the sake of productivi�y. In my opinion, an
understanding

of

democratic

values and

human

psychology,

in

combination with Taylor's scientific methods, might well result in
levels of productivity "scientific management" could not attain.
Taylor's work demonstrates the validity of my argument for a multi
disciplinary

approach

to

overarching

problems.

"Scientific

management, " I truly believe, was developed in an honest attempt to
tap into the vast, unused potential of the work place. However,
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Taylor obviously did not anticipate the negative effects of his
narrow approach. The practical result, then, is a partial, i.e.,
incomplete and, therefore, inefficient, solution to the problem at
hand. As long as individuals are required to produce the goods
demanded by their groups, "scientific management" will not be able
to achieve its greatest potential and the work environment will
remain under the influence of those who created it: individuals.

0

0
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CONCLUSION
The three views discussed in this paper have one thing in
common:

they all recognize the importance of the concepts of

"individual" and "group." It is hardly possible to develop, within
this limited scope, a complete picture of these concepts. However,
this

discussion

leads

to

the

question

of

the

identity

of

individuality.
The philosopher, the psychoanalyst, and the manager proceed
from different understandings of individuality. Thus, individuals,
thems elves, interpret the concept in many different ways. One could
simply conclude that individuality is what sets us apart from all

Q

others.

However,

such

an

interpretation

does

not

take

into

consideration the complexity of the concept.
The individual has no choice but to a�cept the limitations
imposed on him in today's society. It appears to me that he could
not survive without the safety of the group, even if that safety
seems precarious. The term "free spirit" has become a cliche and a
paradox. The individual, in this context, can only be recognized in
comparison

to

the group.

This

leads

to

the

conclusion

that

individual and group are inseparable. Individuality thus becomes a
basic characteristic of the group.
Furthermore,

group behavior

may

be

considered

the

most

influential factor affecting individuality. An individual, born
into a group, will at first mimic the behavior of the other group

0
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constituents. As he evolves within the group, he will tend to
assume its values and behaviors through this process of mimesis,
not conscious learning. However, there appears to be a point in the
evolution of the individual where he develops critical faculties
which will determine his further development.
In order to develop critical faculties, the individual has at
his disposition two distinct sets of information:

the readily

available one provided by his group, and the more comprehensive one
which exists outside of the boundaries of his group. Although there
exist relatively closed and isolated groups in today's society,
most seem to be open and willing to interact at least on an
intellectual level with others.

The individual's

ability and

willingness to interpret his knowledge obtained from both worlds

Q

determine his degree of individuality.
For many, this process of interpretation results in the making
of choices. Remaining with the original group, as well as joining
a different one, become individual decisions. Since such decisions
are made based upon the individual's sense of compatibility with
the values and behaviors of any group, the latter, again, become
the driving factors. The quality of "individuality" could thus be
determined as a function of the individual's degree of intellectual
freedom of choice and extent to which that choice depends on the
feedback obtained from the sources of his interest.
Intellectual freedom of choice varies in accordance with the
influence exerted by the group on each individual member.

so

The

Q

emotional ties, described by Sigmund Freud, vary in their intensity
relative to each individual. The latter's decision to agree or
disagree with his group's values may be influenced only marginally
or, on the contrary, very largely by his emotional relationship
with the group itself, and other group members. Although a group
member's decisions remain individual ones in all circumstances,
they nevertheless reflect the degree of influence exerted by the
group. Individuality therefore is a conglomerate of individual and
group characteristics.
The paradoxical nature of these findings is reflected in the
writings of Rousseau, Freud, and Taylor. The philosopher indicates
that in order to survive, the individual mµst first perish. The

Q

psychologist reasons that the group must change to assure the
survival of the individual: however, the group must inevitably,
even tragically,

adopt the values of an ineluctably "reduced"

individual. The manager requires the elimination of the individual
in

order

to

satisfy

that

individual's

demands.

individuality becomes a function of the group.

Finally,

"Individual" and

"group" have no apparent value as stand-alone concepts. They only
become meaningful when considered together.

According to this

study,

two

while

complementary

"individual"
concepts,

and "group"
their

are

interaction

distinct

appears

to

but
be

fundamentally paradoxical: just as the concept of "individual" or
the idea of "group" seems determined, its sense must diverge from
that

J

initial

determination

in

order
51

to

achieve

its

fullest

0

elaboration. Whether this state of affairs functions productively
or destructively, however, remains to be demonstrated in the human
laboratory.

0

0
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